



Collaborative DDoS Mitigation & The DDoS Clearing House

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DDoS remains relevant





Problem

 Mature DDoS mitigation services (e.g., scrubbing), routinely handling large numbers of DDoS attacks

- BUT no sharing of DDoS data and expertise between organizations
 - Increases response time and prevents learning because of limited view
 - Reduces innovation of mitigation processes and systems at ecosystem level
 - DDoS data "stuck" in systems of DDoS mitigation providers


• Increases probability of societal disruptions through online services



Collaborative DDoS Mitigation

Goal: Improve collective DDoS resilience with additional activities

- + Sharing
 - DDoS metadata
 - Mitigation strategies
 - Tools and services
- + Practice together
 - DDoS drills
 - Cyber ranges





Examples

- Network playbook sharing for DNS Anycast (Tech talk II)
- IXP scrubber (Tech talk III)
- MANRS (Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security)
- DDoS Clearing House



DDoS Clearing House


• Sharing of **DDoS fingerprints** between organizations

• Generic concept: **Anti-DDoS Coalitions** across sectors, Member States, business units, etc.

 Extends DDoS protection services that service providers use and does not replace them



DDoS Clearing House





DDoS Fingerprint Example

```
fingerprint a38e5062b69fd7b8c5194fa7698398a7
attack vectors: [
     service: "HTTP"
    protocol: "TCP"
    source_port: 80
    fraction_of_attack: 1.0
    destination_ports: "random"
    TCP_flags: {
       ...A...: 0.989
    nr flows: 5077
     nr_packets: 20308000
     nr_megabytes: 30599
    time_start: "2022-01-23 01:28:00"
    time_end: "2022-01-23 01:29:56"
     duration seconds: 116
     source_ips: [
       *31.000.148.00*
       *10.000.000.00
target: "Anonymous"
tags: [
  "TCP ACK flag attack"
key: "a38e5062b69fd7b8c5194fa7698398a7"
time start: "2022-01-23 01:28:00"
duration seconds: 116
total_flows: 5077
total_megabytes: 30599
total_packets: 20308000
total_ips: 4
avg_bps: 2110318068
avg_pps: 175068
avg_Bpp: 1506
submitter: "thijs"
submit_timestamp: "2022-01-25T13:50:13.818348"
shareable: False
```



Key innovations

• Bridge multidisciplinary gap to deployment, more than tech!

- Opensource design that we make available through a "cookbook"
 - Technology, legal, organizational, lessons learned based on pilots
 - Enable federations of organizations to set up their own anti-DDoS coalition
 - Main use case is the Dutch Anti-DDoS Coalition (NL-ADC)

• Operates across heterogeneous networks and offers rich set of services



DDoS Clearing House pilots

- The Netherlands
 - In the existing Dutch Anti-DDoS Coalition (17 partners)
 - Cross-sectoral
 - One producer of fingerprints
- Italy
 - Smaller scale: Telecom Italia SOC & Security Lab + University of Turin
 - Intra-organizational
 - MISP




DDoS Testbed

- Representative environment used to
 - Test the technical developments of the Clearing House
 - Demonstrate our work
 - Cyber range for practicing DDoS

- DDoS traffic simulator
 - Small scale
 - Dashboard for attack customization







What's next?

DDoS Clearing House Cookbook

Production phase at the NL-ADC

Wrap up CONCORDIA with demonstration & reports



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Dutch Anti-DDoS Coalition: https://www.nomoreddos.org/en/

Clearing house on GitHub: https://github.com/ddos-clearing-house/

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